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 In March 1942 the fate of the Jews of Slovakia seemed sealed. As a protectorate of Nazi 
Germany, the Slovak Republic ordered the deportation of the region’s Jews to “resettlement 
camps” in Poland. Yet only seven months later, the deportations had completely ceased and did 
not resume for two years. How did a country so eager to be rid of its Jewish population that it 
initially paid Germany to deport Jews change policy to such a radical degree?1  Germany desired 
to present Slovakia as a successful and independent country and the liberal relationship it 
established with Slovak politicians was an essential component in diverting the objective to 
murder Slovakia’s Jewish population.  
 Existing scholarship on these events has yielded several explanations for the two-year 
cessation of Jewish deportations. Joan Campion asserts that the bribery of Slovak and German 
officials by the underground Working Group was responsible for the halt in deportations.2 
Further, John Conway presents the theory that pressure from the Vatican and other religious 
leaders in Slovakia turned public opinion against the deportations.3 On this subject, Ivan 
Kamenec emphasizes the importance of a series of exemptions put in place by the Slovak 
government to effect the halt.4 Each of these authors makes a compelling argument in support of 
specific factors affecting Slovakian policy during this period. However, it is necessary to 
consider all of these factors to get a complete picture of the extraordinary actions of Slovakia 
from 1942-1944.  
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 In order to understand the unique events in Slovakia, it is important to have some 
understanding of Slovak-Jewish relations prior to the tenuous independence Slovakia achieved as 
a protectorate of Nazi Germany.  In 1939 there were few places in Europe, and most especially 
in Eastern Europe, where people of Jewish ancestry enjoyed the level of freedom and legal 
equality the Jews of Czechoslovakia did. Reacting to the radical stance of Czechoslovakia, a 
German newspaper declared, “…the bastion of world Jewry in Czechoslovakia must be 
destroyed.”5 While there were no legal restrictions on Slovak Jews, there was an understood and 
deeply rooted anti-Semitism in the region of Slovakia. The Jewish population accounted for only 
4% of the overall Slovak population, but controlled 45% of the region’s assets.6 This was due in 
large part to the effects of the Hungarian Emancipation Act of 1867 and the Nationality Act of 
1868. The emancipation act enfranchised Jews in the Hungarian Empire, while the Nationality 
Act refused to recognize any nationality other than Hungarian. This was part of efforts to 
suppress nationalist movements such as the rising nationalism in the Slovak region.7 Because of 
these sanctions and the general population’s refusal to deny their Slovak identity, economic 
advancement for Slovaks was difficult and the region was scornfully regarded as a land of poor 
peasants by most outsiders.8  Jews were not considered a separate nationality and were not 
required to deny their culture or religion in order to avoid the economic restrictions. This resulted 
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in their having a marked economic advantage over their Slovak neighbors with long-reaching 
effects, not the least of which were an economic dominance and a lingering and strong cultural 
anti-Semitism among Slovak nationalists.  
Language was another barrier between the Jewish population and their Slovak neighbors. 
The majority of the Jews living in Slovakia did not speak Slovak. Even after Hungarian rule, the 
official language of Czechoslovakia was Czech, not Slovak, and the majority of business was 
conducted with German or Hungarian contacts or those in the more industrialized Czech region. 
Consequently, most Jews living in Slovakia spoke some combination of Czech, Hungarian and 
German.9 Slovaks, fiercely preserving their unique culture and language, felt oppressed by all of 
those linguistic groups and tended to see Jews as the local face of far-away enemies. 
 Another contributing factor to anti-Semitism in the region was religion. Slovakia was a 
region of primarily orthodox Jews and devout Catholics. Bratislava, the capitol of the region, 
was considered a center of traditional Jewish culture and boasted the famous Pressburg Yeshiva. 
Religious intolerance toward Jews in Slovakia was significant due to the political sway the 
Catholic Church held over local politics. The ruling political party in the independent Slovak 
Republic was the Slovak People’s Party (HSL’S) headed by Prime Minister and Catholic priest, 
Joseph Tiso.10 Both the HSL’S and the other main political party, the Catholic People’s Party, 
used a combination of religious and cultural anti-Semitism as a political weapon.  
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While the Slovak region embraced anti-Semitic ideology, as the Slovak government 
embarked on its quest to solve “the Jewish problem” it did so with a much different mentality 
than that of Nazi Germany.11 Slovak politicians presented the Jewish problem as limited to the 
disproportionate Jewish representation in the Slovak economy relative to their percentage of the 
region’s population. Slovak, the HSL’S’s newspaper, expressed it thus: “Only the percentage of 
Jews should sit at the honey pot as they formed and still form in Slovakia…Decent Jews should 
be left in peace and allowed to occupy the place appropriate to their percentage.”12 As early as 
1940, Slovakia began imposing restrictions upon Slovak Jews; one of the early restrictions was 
excluding Jews from public education. Public reaction to this, however, was negative. The main 
point of conflict was that the decree drew no distinction between practicing Jews and converted 
Jews. Shortly after it was enacted, therefore, amendments were made excluding Jews on 
religious grounds and also from education in certain trade schools, setting an important 
precedent.13  
 The state of the Slovak economy was the primary fuel for the spread of anti-Semitism in 
the region and represented an important and persistent factor in whether or not the deportation 
trains stopped in 1942. The position Jews in Slovakia held in the region’s economy was pivotal 
in forming public opinion.  While it did not slow the passage of anti-Semitic law, it did in some 
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cases slow its implementation and limit its application.14 The weakness of the Slovak economy 
was a tool later used by Jewish organizations to save lives. 
The Slovak Republic was one of the first satellites to come under the sway of Nazi 
Germany, who intended to present it as a successful and independent country to the rest of the 
world. It was very important that Slovakia conform to the policies of the Reich but equally 
important that Slovakia not appear to be forced.15 For this reason, Germany had a limited 
presence in the region and used diplomatic negotiation rather than force. 
Part of the diplomatic process was the appointment of advisors to the Slovak government; 
chief among these was German representative to Slovakia, Hauptsturmführer Dieter Wisliceny. 
When Wisliceny arrived in 1940, one of the first things he encouraged the Slovaks to do was 
establish a separate institution specifically tasked with creating and implementing anti-Jewish 
policy. By November of 1940 the Central Economic Office (CEO) had enacted a series of edicts 
that came to be known as the Jewish Codex. This was primarily a series of economic sanctions 
intended to limit the ability of Jews to work or do business, while simultaneously stripping away 
Jewish property and placing it in the hands of “Aryan” Slovaks.16 Germany was dissatisfied with 
the fact that it exempted some Jews, namely, converted Jews and their families, professionals 
needed for economic reasons, and young people needed for labor in work camps, but Germany 
addressed the issue of the exemptions with diplomatic pressure on Slovak politicians.17 
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Germany’s commitment to diplomacy is evidenced in an incident occurring in 1939. A group of 
German soldiers “impatient that the Jewish problem was not being solved, stopped passers-by in 
the streets whom they took to be Jews and ordered them to return to the Jewish quarter of 
town.”18 Slovak police intervened, using firearms and truncheons to subdue and arrest five of the 
Germans involved. This event speaks to the unique autonomy and tolerance enjoyed by Slovakia 
as a protectorate of Nazi Germany and sets an important early precedent in German-Slovak 
relations. 
The influence of the Catholic Church on public opinion was significant and while it 
tolerated and in some cases encouraged forms of anti-Semitism, it for the most part rejected the 
racial view of anti-Semitism. In Sicherheitsdienst (SD)19 reports on the political situation and 
leanings of Slovakia written in May of 1940, one officer states, “A final solution of the Jewish 
question in Slovakia will in particular be opposed by the Catholic Church, which under the 
disguise of love of one’s neighbor and other humanitarian sentiments, hinders any decisive steps 
against the plague of Jewry in Slovakia.”20 In 1940 the German Foreign Ministry reported the 
slow and inconsistent enforcement of anti-Jewish law. A report complains, “the Jewish question 
is not being brought closer to a solution in any way.”21  
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In early 1942, within German borders, the German policy with regard to Jews had shifted 
from a mass forced expulsion to an even more extreme form of ethnic cleansing. Far from 
encouraging immigration, Germany sought to close all borders and systematically kill every Jew 
in Europe. Its first step to implementing this policy in its protectorate territories was to deport 
Jews into Germany where the deaths could be carried out under the disguise of work camps.  
When presented with these intensified policies, Wisliceny approached Slovak leaders about the 
deportation of young men and women to a labor colony. In reality the deportees were destined 
for Auschwitz. The Slovaks worried that expelling only young men and women would leave the 
children and aged as dependents on the government and substantial Jewish assets in German 
hands. The Slovaks agreed to the deportations, but only if they retained the right to any Jewish 
property and if Germany agreed that the remaining members of the deported Jews’ families 
would be deported, too.  
Germany initially rejected these stipulations but later negotiated an agreement. The 
Slovaks would take control of all the assets left behind by Jews deported from Slovakia and in 
return the Slovak Republic would pay 500 marks to the German government for each Jew 
deported. Germany argued that this was to reimburse funds used to support the Jews during their 
non-productive assimilation and training period.22     
Jews from Nitra and Tyrnau were some of the first to be sent to Auschwitz23 and 
participated in the construction of Birkenau, an addition to the camp built to ease congestion in 
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the main camp.24 After meeting Germany’s initial demand for young strong workers, the Slovaks 
arranged the continued deportations according to the same policies it applied to the Jewish 
Codex. Those who had converted to some form of Christianity were spared as well as those 
engaged in work which was considered vital to the Slovak economy. Amazingly, the majority of 
the workers so designated were located in concentration work camps that were for the most part 
organized by Jews. The Working Group,25 an unofficial Jewish organization formed to help 
protect Jews from anti-Semitic forces, had for some time exploited every means of ensuring the 
survival of the Jewish people of Slovakia. One of the tactics used by the Working Group to stop 
Jewish deportations was to prove to those in the Slovak government charged with expanding the 
economy that Jews were a vital asset to their cause.  
The first deportations from Slovakia took place on March 26, 1942. By April, Ondrej 
Steiner had collaborated with Dr. Isidor Koso, one of many Slovak officials who cooperated with 
the Working Group. Together, Steiner and Koso established the first versions of Jewish labor 
camps, which would be guarded by Slovak troops but governed internally by the Jewish inmates. 
The camps would be production centers for needed items such as furniture and textiles. Steiner 
reasoned that if Jews could prove themselves a valuable economic asset, the government would 
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resist deporting them. Though this scheme was strongly opposed by Sano Mach, one of the few 
truly racist anti-Semites in the Slovak government, Koso was able to successfully argue for the 
continued existence of the camps.26 A further strong economic incentive to stopping the trains 
was the fact that Germany continued to charge the Slovak Republic 500 marks per Jew deported, 
a price that even the appropriation of Jewish property could not adequately subsidize. 
The vast majority of people in Slovakia were initially convinced that the deported Jews 
were being relocated to working camps. Chava Livni recalled, “We just thought, they are being 
taken away to work.”27 As the trains continued to deport Jews by the thousands, more and more 
objections began to be raised, and the religious leaders of both the Protestant and Catholic 
churches sent protests to the Slovak government. The Vatican, infamous for its overly diplomatic 
and insufficient protests, uncharacteristically wrote concerning reports of the deportations, “The 
Secretariat of State would like to believe that such reports [of the killing of departed Jews] are 
unfounded…being unable to presume that in such a state, which purports to be governed by 
Christian principles, such grave measures could be put into effect.”28 Even the Ministry of 
Transportation, the very ministry at that time responsible for carrying out the deportations, 
complained, stating it was willing to employ Jewish workers and, because of their absence, a 
significant amount of maintenance and investment work had ceased.29  
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On March 25, 1942, the SD reported to Berlin that Vatican intervention had been “sharp 
and pointed.”  The Vatican had gone so far as to summon the Slovak ambassador and request 
instant action on the part of the Slovak government to stop the deportations.30  The report went 
on to state that “all the Catholic bishops, the Slovak Protestant bishops, and the bishop of the 
Greek Uniate Church…have directed a memorandum to President Tiso and a similar one to the 
Slovak government.” The report describes the bishop’s “unbelievable tone” and expresses 
indignation by certain statements such as, “we seek to remind the Slovak government that these 
are God’s creatures” and “the deportation of Christian Catholic souls [i.e. the baptized Jews] to 
pagan Germany constitutes a moral sin, which we are resolved the Slovak people must be 
spared.”31 The Lutheran bishops protested in a letter issued May 20, 1942, stating that the laws 
of God protect “the honour [sic] of the Jews as human beings, so that not one of them should feel 
deprived because of his national, religious or racial attachments…To our sorrow we have been 
compelled to witness deeds which…are contrary to human feelings, to justice and to the law of 
God; they are in no way related to love.” The bishop’s letters were confiscated but due to 
inspired planning immediately broadcast in Slovak via the BBC.32 
In June the SD reported that the deportation of Jews was very unpopular with the Slovak 
population and blamed this unpopularity on the clerics and “English propaganda.”33 The pressure 
was so significant that Prime Minister Tiso specifically requested that he not be told anything 
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about the deportations. An SD report states a fear expressed by Mach that Tiso would not be able 
to stand up to the pressure of the clerics. Another speaks of Tuka’s loyalty to the cause but states 
that he was thwarted by “clever maneuvering.”34  
The clever maneuvering to which the report referred is almost certainly the efforts of the 
Working Group. The Working Group reached out with appeals to the morality and compassion 
of some government officials but more often with bribes. For example, Josef Sivak towed the 
party line with regard to the Jews well enough to “pass muster” but was in fact also a close friend 
of Rabbi Frieder, a member of the Working Group. Sivak was appointed Minister of Education 
and Culture and gave Frieder a secret phone number that allowed them to stay in direct contact. 
He warned the Working Group of planned measures and during the deportations did what he 
could to ensure Jewish schoolmasters were excluded.35 
In other cases, it was necessary to bribe officials, as was the case with the head of the 
president’s bureau, Dr. Isidor Koso. In fact, it was from Koso that the Working Group first 
learned of the planned deportations. They responded by quickly putting forward the plan for 
Steiner’s labor camps but feared that by the time the camps were fully established, there would 
be no Jews left. They then sought to bribe the head of Department 14, the government 
department in charge of solving “the Jewish question” in Slovakia, Dr. Anton Vasek, “the Jew 
King.”  They not only appealed to his bank account but also to his vanity, encouraging him to 
write a book about his fascinating life in politics. This was so successful that Vasek arranged for 
several transports already scheduled to leave the country to encounter technical difficulties that 
caused lengthy delays. Koso and Vasek seem to be examples of Slovak officials that were 
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described as wanting “money, motor-cars, resounding title’s [sic], and the maximum of personal 
pomp and circumstance. They seem to have been quite indifferent to the means by which these 
things were obtained.”36    
The Working Group’s attempts to bribe the Slovak officials produced such success that 
the Group even went so far as to meet with the German representative Dieter Wisliceny. They 
enlisted a corrupt member of the official Jewish Committee named Hochberg, who was familiar 
with Wisliceny, to present the equivalent of $40,000 as a bribe to the German. Hochberg 
pocketed half of the sum and only presented Wisliceny with $20,000.37 However, the German 
accepted that amount immediately before a scheduled visit to Berlin for consultation.  
During this visit he once again presented demands made by Slovak officials that they be 
allowed to send representatives to verify the conditions of the Jewish deportees. Before the bribe, 
Wisliceny had already sent Fritz Fiala, the editor of the Slovak newspaper Grenzbote, to 
Auschwitz, knowing Fiala would write a report that would encourage continued support of the 
deportations. Fiala met with a specially selected, groomed and dressed group of Jewish prisoners 
for photographs.38  These were to be published with a piece of propaganda that was amazing in 
its audacity and designed not only to denigrate fears regarding the true happenings within 
Auschwitz but also to further defame the Jewish people. The articles had only limited success. 
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Slovak clerics dismissed them and Slovak officials continued to insist that the articles were 
insufficient and demanded an official delegation be sent.  
On this trip to Berlin after he had received the bribe, Wisliceny made a more honest 
attempt to get the request granted.   However, he was informed finally that this was impossible 
because most of the Jews deported from Slovakia were already dead. It is believed that this was 
the meeting in which Eichmann informed Wisliceny of the new murderous focus of Nazi policy 
to which Wisliceny famously replied, “May God forbid that our enemies should ever do anything 
similar to the German people.”39 
It remains impossible to determine whether the Working Group’s effort was successful. It 
was thought that Wisliceny might have the authority on the German side of the equation to slow 
or stop the deportations and would consent to do so if bribed.40 While it is true that Wisliceny 
accepted the bribe and the deportations stopped almost immediately, there were many other 
factors at work.  The last transports of deported Jews to leave the country for the next two years 
were the two that were stalled by Vasek’s “temporary difficulties.”41   
Wisliceny continued to appear to cooperate with the Working Group, even going so far as 
to report upcoming activities that might lead to the resumption of the deportations. Steiner, 
Wisliceny’s primary contact, became so emboldened by his manner and continued cooperation 
he once asked Wisliceny, “if he so much wanted to help the Jews why was he in charge of the 
                                                          
39
 Campion, Joan. Gisi Fleishmann and the Jewish Fight For Survival. Miami, Florida: Dvorion Books, 1983. P. 68 
40
 Steinberg, Lucien. Not As A Lamb: The Jews Against Hitler. Glasgow: The University Press, 1974. P. 295 
41
 Ibid. P. 69 
 
 
expulsions?” to which Wisliceny reportedly replied that he was not an anti-Semite but was doing 
his duty as a German soldier.42    
 Steiner continued to work with Wisliceny and also to work on improving and expanding 
the Jewish labor camps which became more and more important to the Slovak economy.43  These 
camps differed so greatly from the concentration and labor camps in Germany and Poland that 
Edith Katz, an imprisoned 21 year old Jewish woman with a heart condition, was transferred to 
the camp at Novaky because it was thought the environment would be better for her health.44 
Meanwhile, cultural activities were encouraged within the camps, and members of the Working 
Group, namely Y.O. Neumann and Steiner, were successful in sneaking weapons into the camps 
intended for the inmates’ self-defense.45 
 The efforts of the Working Group to make the Jews an essential asset to the Slovak 
economy were successful. The religious community succeeded in turning a significant portion of 
public opinion against renewed deportations. The Working Group bribed certain officials, 
distracted others with appeals to their vanity, and convicted others with appeals to their 
humanity.46 Though there were many efforts made to renew the deportation of Jews from the 
region of Slovakia, they were all met with opposition and failed. When concrete plans were 
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presented, politicians openly opposed them.47 Roman Catholic bishops issued a pastoral letter 
read in all the Catholic churches of a country that was 80% Catholic, decrying the attempt to 
resume deportations.48 
 When at last the deportation of Jews began south of Slovakia in Hungary, Slovak 
officials worked to exempt Slovak Jews living in that country from the deportation actions. This 
infuriated both Hungary and Germany. The German ambassador, E. Veesenmayer, sent a 
complaint to the Berlin Foreign Office stating the Slovak Embassy and other Slovak authorities 
had “a special interest in the release and repatriation of arrested Jews with Slovak citizenship, 
which not only disturbs and hinders the progress of the action…but especially…is giving the 
Hungarian government the impression that the Slovak government…hold an essentially opposing 
position on the Jewish question.” At the same time, many pro-Nazi Slovaks hoped that the events 
in Hungary would spur the resumption of deportations in Slovakia. They were thus 
understandably disappointed when Mach, previously one of the staunchest supporters of 
resuming the deportations, announced, “if the Jews do not provoke and force us…we will not 
deport them.” 49 
Unfortunately, the Jews of Slovakia did not have the chance to provoke the Slovak 
government. In August of 1944, there was a rebellion against the HSL’S government and by 
extension the German government. Slovak partisans were encouraged to revolt by Russian 
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authorities who promised military support.50 With Germany’s faring so badly on the Eastern 
front and the assurances of the Russians, the Slovaks believed they could succeed. They were 
wrong. Germany, finally freed of diplomatic restraint, attacked in force and quickly quelled the 
rebellion. 20,000 Jews, almost all which remained in the Slovak Republic, were deported in 
October and November of 1944. Most of them never returned. 
All of the efforts to both stop the deportation trains and keep them from resuming were 
significant. The influence of the Vatican and both the Catholic and Protestant church was 
substantial in directing public opinion against the deportations. By providing significant 
economic incentives, both personal and political, to Slovak and German politicians, the actions 
of the often marginalized Working Group were undeniable contributing factors in the halt of 
deportations. The actions of these groups were seldom conducted in conjunction with each other 
but nevertheless worked together, placing pressure on Slovak officials to create more and more 
exemptions.  
Yet, the most startling and arguably most important contributor to the halt of deportations 
remains Germany itself. Few of the other influences and factors previously discussed would have 
succeeded or even been possible had Germany not allowed Slovakia an unprecedented amount of 
autonomy. The most compelling evidence for the importance of Germany’s diplomatic policies 
in the thwarting of its own goals is the fact that the deportation of Jewish Slovaks only resumed 
when Germany abandoned that diplomacy. 
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